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Focus on elections: Remarks on the Contemporary Methodology  
for Classifying Non-Democratic Regimes 
 
STANISLAV BALÍK, JAN HOLZER1 
 
Abstract:  
 
This article describes and analyses current trends in classifying non-democratic regimes. A 
brief overview of the basic typologies (J. J. Linz, S. P. Huntington, W. Merkel) is given first. The 
article then focuses on the methodology currently used for classifying non-democratic regimes, one 
which is connected to a significant degree with the theory of so-called hybrid regimes. Placing a 
strong emphasis on the texts of L. Diamond, A. Schedler, S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, the authors 
attempt to illustrate the methodological consequences the application of this theory has for the relevant 
area of political science. The authors particularly concentrate on the exclusive role of the elections as a 
variable of classification, or, respectively, on the concept of elections as a criterion applied in a 
continuum between electoral democracies at the one end, and competitive authoritarianisms at the 
other. This paper provides a critical reflection on this approach and points out its methodological 
limits. According to the authors, elections can be used to discriminate between democracies and non-
democracies, however, within the category of the non-democratic regime one needs to apply a 
different set of criteria in order to be able to discriminate further.  
Keywords: Theory of non-democratic regimes, democracy, authoritarian regime, theory of 
hybrid regimes, liberal democracy, electoral democracy, pseudodemocracy, electoral authoritarianism, 
ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarianism, hegemonic authoritarianism, minimum criteria for 
democracy. 
 
The ambition to introduce order into the sphere of models and types of states and 
regimes is one of the basic characteristics of political theory. Already Aristotle, with his 
famous six-part typology of polities, introduced into the theory of politics the two basic 
themes that remain pertinent to this day – who and how (or rather for whose benefit) rules  –  
as well as a proposal of criteria for discriminating between the individual types of polities 
                                                          
1 This text forms part of a project funded by GAČR No. 407/04/0331 Nedemokratické politické 
systémy v postkomunistickém areálu. Its authors teach at the Department of Political Science, Faculty 
of Social Studies at Masaryk University and are members of the Institute for Comparative Political 
Research at the same university in Brno, Czech Republic. They can be reached at balik@fss.muni.cz 
and holzer@fss.muni.cz. 
 2 
(regimes, constitutions) (see e.g. Císař 2003: 49-56 for a perspective in Czech). There is no 
need to develop this historical perspective any further in this text, as it is enough to say that 
we encounter this ambition at every stage in the development of political thought – the 
theoretical or paradigmatic choices made at any given moment having little bearing on it. 
Both fascination with differentiating the just, good state or government from its vicious 
opposites, and the general search for, or even construction of, this just and good state, seem to 
be timeless. 
At the same time, however, it is necessary to state with some scepticism that there is 
no unified and generally accepted method for classifying  political regimes in political 
science. There is not even a consensus that political science is able to create such a 
classification. As such, we are approaching the theme of the methodological limits of the 
social sciences here. To be able to proceed further we must admit first the possibility, and 
second the usefulness, of this attempt at classification. At the same time we need to note that 
in any debates on this topic there is a tension between the genuinely existing regime types on 
the one side, and the theoretically formulated categories (ideal types) on the other. The latter, 
although “based on observation, are not descriptions of any actual institution” (Mulgan 1998: 
84). This tension has significant consequences for the present text.  
As the remarks above indicate, the primary purpose of this paper is to describe and 
comment on the contemporary transformations of classifications (typologies) of non-
democratic regimes. We will primarily use data gathered after 1989 in the so-called post-
communist studies. To be more specific, we intend to evaluate the arguments and methods of 
some contemporary attempts at classification in this field and point out some potential risks 
associated with the theory of so-called hybrid regimes. The implicit goal of the text, linked as 
it is to the specialization of the journal in which it is published, is to judge the limits of the 
application of the elections qua the key criterion in differentiating between the various types 
of non-democratic regimes.  
 
*** 
 
Decades of transformation of theories of non-democratic regimes naturally brought 
about a large number of suggested typologies of those regimes. Not all of them were based on 
the same postulates, and not all of them followed the same criteria. Two representative 
scholars are worth mentioning here: Edward Shils and Samuel P. Huntington. 
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In his text Political Development in the New States (1960, 1962) E. Shills offered the 
academic community his categorization of political systems comprised of five models: four 
models of non-democratic regimes plus the category of political democracies. Shils 
distinguished (1) tutelary democracies, (2) modernizing oligarchies, (3) totalitarian 
oligarchies, which are divided into two categories, bolshevik and traditionalist, and finally (4) 
traditional oligarchies. This categorization was primarily reacting to the contemporary (end 
of 1950s, beginning of 1960s) need for order in the colourful group of new states in the so-
called Third World, which was going through intensive wave of decolonisation at the time. 
The theory of modernisation provided the frame for this typological effort; as such the key 
criterion used by Shills to create each category was the method which the given regime 
selected for overcoming traditional socio-economic and political-cultural forms and achieving 
the desired modernising (in the wide meaning of this word) effects. This applies especially to 
the first three types; the traditional oligarchies, on the other hand, applied a conversely 
oriented method, namely a desperate defense of traditions and evasion of the risks of 
modernisation (Shills, 1960 and 1962, respectively; in Czech, see Říchová 2000: 259-263 and 
Balík 2003: 264-266, respectively). 
The paradigm of modernisation was also respected in S. P. Huntington’s typology of 
non-democratic regimes (for an overview in Czech, see Říchová 2000: 267-272 and Balík 
2003: 266-268). Huntington’s famous concept of pretorian society, characterised by a high 
level of political participation, limited institutionalisation and rampant corruption, where the 
social atmosphere drowns in conflict and various social groups and even some institutions 
(first and foremost the Army) resolutely enter the sphere of politics, was a key classificational 
antipode at the time to the concept of totalitarianism of Z. Brzezinsky and C. J. Fridrich 
(1956). Huntington (1968: 192-263) distinguished three types of pretorian societies according 
to the level of participation of the population: oligarchic (low level of participation), radical 
(medium level of participation) and mass (high level of participation).
1
 
Since the 1970s Juan José Linz’s now classic contribution (Linz 1973 and 2000) has 
dominated debates on the typologizing of non-democratic regimes. His positions, both in 
methodology and classification, were partially problematized after 1989. We comment 
elsewhere on the validity of those objections (Balík & Holzer 2006). Even Linz himself 
(together with Alfred Stepan) modified some of his propositions, and the classifications 
stemming from those propositions, under the influence of empirical facts, reflecting first the 
ferment in some of the Soviet-dominated countries in the 1980s, and later the wave of 
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collapses of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, in Caucasus and Middle Asia 
at the turn of 1980s and 1990s.  
Linz and Stepan above all re-classified the original four basic types of non-democratic 
regime (totalitarian, authoritarian, traditional and dictatorship) into different four categories, 
that is, into totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarian and sultanistic regimes (Linz – 
Stepan 1996: 38-54). As far as the methods of studying non-democratic regimes are 
concerned, this was, without exaggeration, an epochal transformation, because the key 
variables used in the typologization of this group of regimes changed. The question: How do 
non-democratic regimes work?, that is, how is power executed, organized, issues of 
interconnections between the power and the society, or the role of citizens in the system 
arranged, no longer seems so important (Linz 2000: 159-160) – and this is true both at the 
level of possible practical application of this theory, and at the level of purely theoretical 
abstraction. Attention was shifted to the question: How do non-democratic regimes end?, or 
whether they can end at all (cf. for example the claim that totalitarian regimes cannot end);
2
 
and if they can indeed end, How can they arrive at the moment when the transition to 
democracy starts? But also, What are the conditions, the strategies used? What kind of actors 
are present (or not present)? And, How is this likely to shape the outcome?, etc. 
Because the constructs of transitology had a strong influence on political theory at the 
time, political theory focused on the question of the influence of the previous type of non-
democratic regime on the systemic transition towards democracy or, respectively, on the 
following consolidation of democracy (this being often a possibility rather than a prospect). 
From the point of view of the theory of non-democratic regimes, it was the concentration on 
defining the sum of minimal “implications” for the tasks of transition and consolidation 
towards democracy which constituted the important shift in methodology (Linz – Stepan 
1996: 55ff.). It should be mentioned at this point that this shift was linked with omnipresent 
optimism which suggested the darkest future for non-democratic regimes and a victorious 
spread of democracy all over the world. 
From the number of new terms seeking to denominate contemporary transformations 
of non-democratic regimes in the world we will be interested here only in attempts to create 
new general typologies of non-democratic regimes. Not all of the typologies fall 
automatically under the so-called hybrid paradigm, the ruling one in this area of political 
science in the last decade of the previous century. Isolated, area-limited concepts with no 
ambitions at comparing or classifying (e.g. M. McFaul or F. Zakaria), or texts which are 
mostly overviews (D. Collier and S. Levitsky among others), will not be analysed in this 
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paper. With this in mind, we will open our topic by considering contributions from three 
authors representing different scholarly traditions: Wolfgang Merkel, a German political 
scientist, Paul Brooker, who represents the Anglo-Saxon school, and the Hungarian political 
scientist Attila Ágh. 
 
Merkel is interesting both for his argument and for an attempt to cover as many of the 
modern non-democratic regimes as possible, including those which appeared as a result of the 
third wave of democratization in the post-communist area, thus leaving no space for 
exceptions or deviant cases.  
On the general level, Merkel respects the division of non-democratic forms into 
totalitarian and authoritative. In the first group he distinguishes communist, fascist and 
theocratic regimes (Merkel 1999: 50-52). The category of authoritarian regimes is larger: the 
subtypes are again communist (see below for the concept of Parteidiktatur) and fascist, and 
then the „classic“ authoritarian regimes, that is military, organic-etatist, racist, modernizing, 
theocratic, dynastic (royal and monarchic) and sultanistic.  
Using this typology, Merkel intended amongst other things to solve the problem of the 
different degrees of intensity of totalitarianism/authoritarianism in the different evolutionary 
phases of communist and national socialist systems. Depending on the answer to the question 
Who holds the power? Merkel distinguishes Parteidiktatur and Führerdiktatur. In the case of 
communist regimes, it is only the latter of those two forms that can be an actual totalitarian 
system, whereas the model of Parteidiktatur signals only an authoritarian basis. As far as 
fascist regimes are concerned, Merkel is convinced that only the Third Reich between 1938–
1945 was totalitarian. All of the other fascisms in the shape of Führerdiktatur represent again 
only an instance of authoritative form. Let us consider Merkel’s classification of non-
democratic regimes as a proof of the fact that reflection on modern non-democratic forms of 
regimes can respect Linz’s methodology of the study of those regimes.  
In his book Non-Democratic Regimes. Theory, Government & Politics (2000) Paul 
Brooker first recapitulates the classic concepts of totalitarianism (Arendt 1951 and 1962, 
Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956, Schapiro 1972) and authoritarianism (Linz 1964 and 1973, 
O´Donnell 1973, Perlmutter 1981). Those authors concentrate on the question: How do 
dictatorships govern?, which in Brooker’s view is often unnecessarily ambitious. Brooker 
recommends seeking the answer to a subtler question in our attempts to identify the type of 
any given non-democratic regime: Who or what governs? According to Brooker, it can be 
either (1) army or (2) party or (3) leader.  
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Within the framework of those basic categories Brooker (2000: 36-58) then comments 
on the various theories and approaches belonging to one of the three aforementioned variants: 
from movement-regime of Robert C. Tucker (Tucker 1961) and Huntington’s wide array of 
one-party systems (Huntington 1970), through variously defined military regimes of Samuel 
E. Finer (1962), Amos Perlmutter (1974 and 1977), Eric A. Nordlinger (1977) and S. P. 
Huntington again (1968), and finally to what are often minute nuances of personalist types of 
non-democratic regimes –  beginning with a classic Weberian perspective and ending with 
more contemporary contributions (e.g. Zolberg 1966; Roth 1968; Eisenstadt 1973; Linz 1975; 
Jackson – Rosberg 1982 and others).  
A significant part of Brooker’s monograph is dedicated to the analysis of models of 
individual non-democratic regimes, that is to the description and analysis of their motives, 
ideological roots, ways of gaining legitimacy, and consolidation, but also naturally the 
possibilities associated with their establishment, and finally their “degeneration” into potential 
democracies. Some of the last chapters are dedicated to imperfect transitional regimes, that is 
semi-dictatorial and semi-democratic variants of regimes; others form a sceptical inquiry into 
the proclaimed twilight of non-democratic regimes. Brooker’s treatment of his theme is 
therefore well-balanced: his ambitions at typology are linked to the classical models of the 
1970s and 1980s, but this does not prevent him from accentuating new topics, especially the 
hard times the non-democratic regimes experienced at the end of 1980. However, he does not 
necessarily intend to construe this contemporary trend as a definitive and general perspective.  
Central European political science produced no generally conceived classification of 
non-democratic regimes in the 1990s nor any at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, not even in 
a smaller, area-limited framework. We therefore mention here Atilla Ágh’s contribution 
(1998) more or less as an illustration. Ágh confronted the results of the transitions in Central 
and South-Eastern Europe after 1989 with the democratic ideal and identified two categories 
of “post-communist” hybrid regimes: (1) semi-democracies, where alternation of 
governments is complicated yet possible in elections (for example Slovakia during the rule of 
V. Mečiar, Croatia, Macedonia or Romania), and (2) pseudo-democracies, where the political 
opposition is legal but does not have the means to win power peacefully in elections, and is 
therefore condemned to use non-electoral means (Serbia or Albania).  
 
*** 
 
 7 
To understand how revolutionary the changes in classification of non-democratic 
regimes are we need to look into the theory of hybrid regimes which is linked with the 
paradigm of transitology that became dominant in the 1990s (see Balík – Holzer 2006). This 
scholarly perspective has brought about a range of attempts to name and define the allegedly 
new, never-before-seen types of non-democratic regime. Those numerous contemporary new 
types usually arose from imperfect or unfinished partings from non-democracy. The ability to 
embark on a voyage of liberalisation and subsequent democratization was attributed solely to 
authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes. This meant focusing on the extremely fluid 
dimension between the authoritarian and democratic regimes. The attack was then 
concentrated on the very category of authoritarian regimes, whose fairly wide definition 
meant that when evaluating the outcome of the third wave of democratization, “authoritarian 
regime” became a “container” encompassing nine out of ten new examples of “modern” non-
democratic regimes cited in literature (Linz – Stepan 1996: 55-65). One of the implicit 
aspirations of this text is to answer the question as to whether this category has lost its basic 
value, its categorial clarity and its applicability. 
By no means should this signify that the theory of hybrid regimes has ousted from 
contemporary political science all other attempts to deal with the issue of new types of non-
democratic regime. According to Andreas Schedler (2006: 3-5) there are three alternative 
conceptual strategies by means of which one can perceive the post-transition non-democratic 
regime types. The famous concepts of delegative democracy of G. O’Donnell (1994) and non-
liberal democracy of F. Zakaria (1997) belong to the category of so-called defective 
democracies. The second strategy uses traditional methods of research and is represented here 
by the theory of new authoritarianisms. The ambition to understand and define the ostensibly 
unique post-transition non-democratic regime type is typical of the third strategy of hybrid 
regime.  
As we can see, Schedler does not classify non-democratic regimes. What he tries to 
achieve is the organization of methodological options associated with their study and the 
variables emphasized by those methods. On a general level Schedler’s text nevertheless 
implicitly tends towards the hybrid paradigm, since it explicitly concentrates on the functional 
logic and perspectives of electoral authoritarianism. This is one of the key concepts of a new 
typology of contemporary non-democratic regimes which is tied to the theory of hybrid 
models. And their analytical and typological methods are precisely the subject of the present 
paper. Texts by Larry Diamond (Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, 2002: 21-35), Andreas 
Schedler (The Menu of Manipulation, 2002: 36-50) and Steven Levitsky with Lucan A. Way 
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(The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 2002a: 51-65) provide representative  material for 
analysis, not only because they are ambitious attempts to define and order the various types of 
hybrid regimes, but also because they work precisely with those criterial tools that are typical 
of the hybrid paradigm. Indeed, those tools are present in the texts mentioned in an almost 
pure form.  
 
Let us begin with a seemingly banal observation: the first task a of scholar who tries to 
classify non-democratic regimes is the very separation of the non-democracies from the 
democracies, that is, to identify the two most basic categories of regimes. As Giovanni Sartori 
(1993) has already shown, the questions as to whether a certain regime is a democracy or not 
on the one hand, and to what degree it is democratic on the other hand, are totally different. 
However, they are not mutually exclusive, but rather supplement each other, though the 
priority must always be given to the definition of the corresponding category. It is only later, 
inside the specific exclusively defined type of regime that we ask how well a specific regime 
corresponds to the definition created, and that we study variations in practice, etc. (cf. Sartori 
1993: 183-186). 
We need to stress here that to a certain degree adherents to the theory of hybrid 
regimes give up on defining an empirically consistent format that would define the boundary 
between democracies and non-democracies. Rather than soberly concentrating on the 
verifiable, empirically graspable and therefore comparable data, they emphasize approaches 
which speculate about various sums of abstract qualities which the contemporary democracy 
should – according to them – unquestionably fulfil. Such approaches more or less ignore 
complications relating to the measurement of social phenomena.  
From the methodological outputs of the various authors we can establish only the 
following axiom: the more we “load” the concept of democracy with a sum of certain 
expectations, the more we complicate our way to a relevant and verifiable classificatory 
analysis. Conversely, for the purity and openness (and therefore transparency) of a method of 
classification it is advantageous to concentrate on the smallest number of criteria possible 
(ideally on one criterion only) – but also on criteria whose definition (contents) is truly valid.  
In this sense it seems natural to choose the classic concept of Joseph A. Schumpeter
3
 
from the pool of possible definitions of democracy. Schumpeter’s minimalist definition 
conceives democracy as a system where the legitimacy of power is based on periodic and 
open competition for the votes of the electorate (see Schumpeter 2004: 287-320). It therefore 
fulfils at least one of the aforementioned conditions: it is based on one key criterion, that is 
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the presence of elections. This technicist concept is clearly contradictory to the modernist 
social-liberal calls for guarantees of a maximalist set of civic and political equal rights (see for 
example the works of David Held), including the rights of groups (typically of women – cf. 
the texts of Susan Moller Okin, Anne Phillips, Iris Young and others). In a sense, those 
dominate the theory of democracy at the end of the second and beginning of the third 
millenium.  
What do we gain if we say that mere form, that is, the existence of democratic 
institutions, is not enough to determine if the regime studied is democratic or not? How does 
this affect our attempts to distinguish between democracies and non-democratic regimes? If 
we state that elections can mask an authoritarian dominance and their presence is not a 
sufficient guarantee of free and fair competition, is this statement really adequate from a 
methodological point of view? Does it help to attain a pure and applicable classification of 
categories of political regimes? Or does it on the contrary complicate it, and transfer the 
whole issue into an area where comparison is difficult?  
Thanks to such questions we arrive for the first time in this text at the necessity to 
comment on the role of elections as the basic criterion. To put it succintly: the presence of 
elections expresses a plural socio-political arrangement in the given polity. The dilemma is 
now expressed as follows: in defining the democratic format, is it right to limit this plurality 
to the question of the free electoral competition of political parties and movements for power 
(that is to Linz’s sphere of political society), or should we equally request plurality in other 
spheres affected by the political processes in the given regime?  
A sober, realistic answer which respects the already stated preferences of the authors 
is: in democracies it is precisely the election which is the most natural – and to a significant 
degree exclusive – arena where the redistribution of power is made legitimate. By competing 
in an election any actor becomes a political actor. In democratic political practice it is 
exclusively the legitimacy created by the electoral competition which creates the entitlement 
to attain and execute power. This concept falls within the boundaries of classic theory, which 
distinguishes authoritarian regimes from both democracy and totalitarianism by observing that 
they are not based on either the legitimacy arising from election or the legitimacy arising from 
revolution. 
Other general principles of political competition, such as the concept of conflict (what 
is normal versus what is excessive?), the concept of state (is it all-powerful or limited?), 
whether the actors are able or unable to leave the political scene, whether there is space for 
new actors to enter into – those principles are unquestionably relevant variables which can be 
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used to test the degree of democracy in the regime studied, but not the very presence of 
democracy. In other words, phenomena such as freedom, order, transparency, responsibility, 
the rule of law, etc. are worth scholars’ attention, but only as variables indicating the quality 
of a given democracy. They cannot be used to establish the (non)existence of democracy as 
such. 
We therefore do not need to be offended by a number of scholars, including L. 
Diamond, who distinguish between e.g. electoral democracies (in Schumpeter’s sense) and 
liberal democracies (Diamond 2002: 25-27). This means distinguishing the regime type 
within the set of democratic regimes. The adjective, typically liberal (or, in E. Shils work, 
political – cf. Shils 1960) gives the noun a concrete content. The noun defines the form and 
procedure, whereas the adjective suggests the quality. For the presence of fair, competitive 
and multi-party elections is a primary characteristics of both liberal and electoral democracies. 
At the same time the practice of electoral democracy is exhausted by the very act of election.  
In their judgement of electoral democracy all the observers, including the opponents of 
a wide, participative theory of democracy, can therefore agree on one thing: they (neutrally) 
point out the absence of adequate civic activity as defined in the concept of civic political 
culture of G. A. Almond and S. Verba (1971). They differ in their evaluation of the 
desirability of such phenomena, but that is a theme which falls outside our interests at this 
point. What exactly the electoral democracies miss in comparison with liberal democracies is 
then an issue of definition: for example, Schedler mentions the absence of attributes such as 
checks and balances, bureaucratic integrity or even-handed justice (Schedler 2002: 37-38): 
others point out the absence of the strict and verifiable honouring of political liberties and 
civic rights, in the sense of the rule of law. What is important for us here is that the very 
category of democracy is not questioned.  
Conversely, an argument based on analysing election results seems inadequate. How 
to interpret an election in which one actor absolutely dominates, or the winner is an openly 
non-democratic actor (non-democratic in his rhetoric, not his praxis, as the latter would mean 
that the format of the election is no longer democratic)? Those questions are relatively 
common. But such observations do not mean that the democratic format of the regime studied 
is questioned. In transitology, there is a general thesis which states the following: a power-
equilibrum of actors who negotiate the new rules of the game during processes of transition 
helps the finding of a democratic point of departure and the subsequent democratic 
consolidation. In a post-transition situation, however, the phenomenon of one actor 
dominating might be a natural effect of the electoral model used without any necessary 
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relationship to the theory of democracy and without any classifying power. The success of a 
non-democratic actor does not on its own implicate a non-democratic regime format. As has 
already been suggested by Klaus von Beyme (1999: 295-304), the presence of anti-systemic 
organization is one of the symptoms of processes of consolidation. It indicates the third phase 
of the consolidation of political actors, leading to the establishment of a complex component 
substructure within the political system. This does not mean that we should ignore such 
phenomena which can complicate the perspectives of democracy in the regime studied, of  
course. But they are not sufficient for the pure and generally applicable criterion we seek. The 
simplest sign indicating to us that we are dealing with democracy therefore remains the 
indeterminacy of the results of elections. 
And yet there is a factor which, at the level of the analysis of outputs of elections, 
complicates justifications for subsuming electoral democracies under the category of 
democracies. The situation where free and fair elections do not lead to the replacement of 
elites – which is an unspoken, but required effect of elections – represents an interesting 
defect. It is not our goal here to explain why the opposition is unable to strip the ruling party 
of power, although searching for an answer to the question as to why the possibilities given to 
the voters by open electoral format are not adequately exploited is certainly exciting. To 
challenge the whole regime type – even if we are aware of the existence of a predominant 
type of party – would be questionable from the point of methodology. The reason is that the 
scholar is obliged here to leave his method – that is, concentrating on one election – and to 
apply a diachronic analysis, which spreads his interest over several elections in a row. How 
many times the given actor has to dominate is a speculative question: the most often 
mentioned number three enjoys no empirical support. 
However, it seems we have identified a criterion which has a real relationship to the 
democratic minimum and is at the same time measurable and thus methodologically valid. 
Concentrating on this variable may truly problematize the classificatory purity of the 
relationship between the institutional electoral format and a general democratic framework. 
Despite this sceptical remark, we believe that the non-normative scholarly approach 
we just described is important. If it is not respected, any attempt to categorize any type of 
regime whatsoever is rendered problematic. 
 
*** 
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From the point of view of methodology the real problems emerge when one 
disrespects the exclusive connection between the given variable and the appropriate 
substantive. The terms electoral authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism are 
flagrant examples of this. As follows from our previous comments, we are either dealing with 
autoritarianism, or with elections and competition. A symbiosis is impossible, even if the 
theory of hybrid regimes works with it.  
It is now time to uncover the basic methodological mechanisms on which attempts at a 
new classification of non-democratic regimes are based. This classification is linked with the 
paradigm of transitology and respects the methods of Freedom House (hereafter referred to as 
FH), a methodology that is often cited, but not nearly often enough critically treated.
4
 FH’s 
evaluation of regimes is based on observing three indicators of guarantees of political rights 
and civic liberties, the openness of a given country and the chances of future democratization. 
FH does not always make its own observations, and sometimes uses second hand data 
produced by local and foreign observers. Fortunately this reliance does not seem to 
compromise the quality of FH’s reports. The three indicators are as follows: (1) the 
percentage of Parliamentary seats held by the party in power, (2) the percentage of votes 
obtained by the presidential candidate of the ruling party, (3) number of years the current elite 
holds power. The types are defined by variable scores, which lend the boundaries between the 
types an ostensibly strict, though hardly verifiable mathematical character. The non-
democratic scale goes from partially-open systems, represented by electoral authoritarianism 
and pseudodemocracy, to politically closed systems: competitive authoritarianism, hegemonic 
noncompetitive authoritarianism, and implicitly even totalitarianism.  
Let us now remind the reader that according to the FH methodology liberal 
democracies achieve scores lower than 2.0 (in Latin America up to 2.3). Liberal democracies 
are followed by a questionable category of regimes defined through a combination of 
multiparty electoral competition and authoritarian dominance. The existence of democratic 
institutions (including elections) in those regimes is supposed to mask (render legitimate) the 
authoritarian execution of power. The ruling party cannot generally be stripped of power – or 
rather, to do so takes long-term pressure from united opposition forces supported by the 
mobilized polity. Authoritarianism is supposed to coalesce here with electoral praxis; the 
regimes hold competitive elections de iure, but the flaws of the electoral competition are 
significant and even the outcome of the election can be predicted. Those regimes, all of  
which achieve scores between 2.3–4.4, are called electoral democracies (score of 2.0–3.5), 
electoral authoritarianisms and pseudodemocracies.  
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These are followed by regimes without electoral competition, which are the classic, 
politically closed authoritarianisms. Among these are ambiguous regimes (score of 3.4–5.4), 
a term which should express the vagueness of the boundary between electoral democracy and 
competitive authoritarianism, as well as between competitive authoritarianisms (score of 4.2–
6.6), hegemonic non-competitive authoritarianisms (score of 4.4–7.6) and classic 
authoritarianisms (score of 6.5–7.7). The distinction between competitive and hegemonic 
authoritarianism is defined by the nature of the opposition in Parliament (more than 90% of 
seats are occupied by the ruling party) and the share of the votes obtained by the winning 
presidential candidate (more than 75%).
5
 
This overview is given here as an illustration only. We do not intend critically to 
analyse its values, although, for example, the distribution of individual terms (e.g. its pushing 
of authoritarianism into an extreme polar position, more suitable to totalitarianism) seems 
rather questionable. The aim is to look closely at the individual types, imagine the arguments 
of its originators and uncover their motives and blind spots. 
 
The first problem lies in separating electoral democracies from electoral 
authoritarianisms. This theme is treated at some length by L. Diamond  (2002: 27–29). 
Bearing in mind his cautious remarks on the haziness of the regimes studied and blurred 
boundary between them, we have to say that his definition, which understands the difference 
between those regime types to be in “free, fair, complex and meaningful elections” (Diamond 
2002: 27), seems debatable to us. And Diamond has no choice but to aim, as always, at the 
problem which lies at the core: how to understand – and apply – elections as the criterion 
which distinguishes between the regimes?  
Diamond starts answering the question by pointing out that elections cannot be 
understood solely on the basis of their formal properties, and that we should therefore pay 
attention to other factors as well, for example, the ability of the opposition and its candidates 
to lead an election campaign or the process of vote counting. Rather than talking about 
measurable degrees, Diamond proposes to talk of trends in which we can see how much the 
parameters of democracy are violated. As Diamond says (with a healthy dose of scepticism), 
even in democracies electoral competition is not always completely equal (actors have 
different levels of funding at their disposal, unequal access to state support, etc.).  
Crucial, however, is his characterization of free and non-free elections. According to  
Diamond, an election is free if the the following points are true: 
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 the barriers preventing the actors from entering the scene of politics are 
not substantial; 
 the candidates and supporters of individual parties enjoy a natural 
freedom; 
 the candidates and supporters of individual parties have roughly equal 
access to public media; 
 the voters are not deciding under any pressure; 
 the administration of the election is executed by an independent and 
competent body; 
 the counting of votes is free from tampering; 
 the army, police and courts of law do not abuse their powers; 
 the government and the state bureaucracy do not enter into play; 
 the rules are transparent and known; 
 independent monitoring is possible and 
 there is a right to appeal (Diamond 2002: 28-29). 
 
Conversely, the election is not free if there is observable violence organised by the 
state or by some of the actor(s). This could, for example, involve a criminalization of 
independent behaviour, the terrorising of adversaries, etc. Diamond adds that we should 
carefully evaluate the scale, model and context of this violence. With reference to Levitsky 
and Way, he believes that the boundary beyond which transgressions are unacceptable is 
constituted by a situation where the minimum criteria for democracy are not met. In other 
words, the opposition clearly does not have equal chances (Diamond 2002: 29). With 
reference to those two definitions, Diamond then proceeds with the assumption that the less 
an election studied is fair, competitive and free, the less democratic the regime is.  
No matter how long Diamond’s list of characteristics of (non-)free elections is, 
substantial questions remain. How to set the boundary between the pure (democratic) and 
impure (non-democratic) nature of elections? And: Is it possible to classify the types of non-
democratic regimes solely on the basis of an analysis of their elections? The fact that 
Diamond’s arguments are fixated mainly on the quality of electoral (non-)competitiveness 
makes them methodologically questionable. By giving up on distinguishing between the two 
basic regime categories and by focusing on a qualitative continuum he admits that even even 
authoritarianism can be compatible with elections. Making democracy and authoritarianism 
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mutually permeable is a methodologically unacceptable step – even if we bear in mind our 
observation that a rise of authoritative methods and procedures is possible within the 
democratic format.  
If we now return to Diamond’s dilemma, namely, what to do with the boundary 
between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism, we can say that the best 
explanation of the whole problem is that the problem does not exist at all. If in the regime 
studied we can observe that the phenomena of the given elections fulfil the basic criteria of 
the concept of election (the election is periodic, the parties can freely participate, formal 
standards are fulfilled), then whatever the election result (even if, for instance, a non-liberally 
oriented actor wins, or the result repeats itself and is then in a sense predictable), there is no 
reason to use the category of authoritarianism. If, on the other hand, the institution of 
elections is used solely as a Potemkin village, then we cannot talk of elections at all and the 
term electoral authoritarianism is a nonsense.
6
 
This situation is in no way changed by introducing the auxiliary category of 
ambiguous regime which should separate electoral democracies from electoral 
authoritarianisms. Despite being fairly common, this is clearly an ill-defined category of 
regimes on the allegedly “blurred boundary between the electoral democracies and 
competitive autoritarianisms”, ones which the observers are unable to attain consensus about 
(Diamond 2002: 26). Besides, Diamond does not list reasons why those ambiguous regimes 
should be located exclusively in the transitional space between the two aforementioned 
subtypes. Why, for example, should any other regimes about which there is no consensus, 
regimes that cause controversy amongst the experts or regimes that cannot be clearly 
classified, why should they not be called ambiguous regimes? In an academic context, this 
explanation is far too clumsy.  
 
The distinction between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarianisms by way 
of elections is also a crucial theme for Andreas Schedler (2002).
7
 Schedler alerts us to the fact 
that elections can be both an expression of the triumph of democracy and a tool of 
authoritarian manipulation. They can be organized so scandalously that no one takes them 
seriously, but they can also be an opportunity for power struggle so unique that no one can 
allow themselves to ignore them. He also admits that his set of democratic norms needs to be 
balanced by the observation that „empirical reality is fuzzy“ (Schedler 2002: 38). 
Schedler is explicitly interested in regimes that use neither a democratic practice of 
government nor overt repression. Such regimes organize elections in the hope of maintaining 
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the out- or inwardly oriented appearance of legitimacy, but also as a way of keeping the 
existing elites in power. The unspoken meaning of their elections is to “reap the fruits of 
electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty” (Schedler 2002: 37). 
With reference to R. A. Dahl, Schedler thus defines seven signs (or dimensions) that the 
election ought to fulfil in order to be called democratic (the normative premises of democratic 
choice), but also (in parallel) seven coercive electoral strategies. When applying the analysis 
of elections to the spectrum of regimes from liberal democracies to electoral authoritarianism 
we are again faced with some sort of a qualitative electoral continuum.  
 The seven attributes of democratic elections are defined by Schedler as follows (2002: 
39-41): 
1. electoral empowerment. This means that in an election the postulate “power 
proceeds from the people” is fulfilled. An election is thus the most important instrument of 
collective decision making (the object of choice); 
2. freedom of supply. Political alternatives (candidates, parties) out of which the 
citizens choose during an election can be freely formed (the range of choice);  
3. freedom of demand. Citizens can freely examine the alternatives offered and make 
their preferences on the basis of freely available, non-censored information from multiple 
sources (the formation of preferences); 
4. scope of inclusion in election. The right to vote is given equally to all adult 
members of the polity, their social, educational, ethnic, etc. position notwithstanding (the 
agents of choice);  
5. insulation in election. The ballot is made in secret and in person, as a means of 
protection from inappropriate external pressure (the expression of preferences); 
6. integrity of election. Voting is equal, because each individual has one vote. This is 
guaranteed by a professional, competent and neutral electoral management body (the 
aggregation of preferences) and 
7. irreversibility of election. The election result must impact the power arrangements. 
Whoever holds power realises (and ends) his mandate according to the rules given in the 
constitution (the consequences of choice).  
 
In contrast to these qualities Schedler (2002: 39-46) lists the following properties 
typical of elections in non-democracies:  
1. reserved positions and domains in elections. The organisational or legislative 
spheres of elections are more or less closed or at least under control and therefore relegate the 
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citizens to a secondary position, which is also a situation of a procedural subordination (the 
object of choice); 
2. exclusion or fragmentation of opposition forces in elections. Various strategies 
complicating and sometimes even preventing the free constitution of the opposition camp and 
cooperation within it are employed. This sometimes leads to elections without choice (the 
range of choice)
8
; 
3. repression and unfairness of an election. Political and civic rights are violated and 
access to information and finance is unequal (the formation of preferences);  
4. formal and informal disenfranchisement, based on any potentially distinctive signs 
or attributes (most often ethnicity), and on both legislative and practical levels (the agents of 
choice); 
5. coercion and corruption in elections, most often by bullying the opposition 
candidates and their supporters, but also by buying votes, bribery etc. (the expression of 
preferences);
9
 
6. electoral fraud and institutional bias. The existing elites are able to influence the 
electoral competition and influence the redistribution. Starting with the registration of voters 
and candidates and ending with the vote counting itself, they thus attempt to avoid losing the 
election (the aggregation of preferences) and 
7. usage of tutelage and reversal during and after the election. The ruling political 
elites are thus able to influence their re-election or even guarantee it. However, if they really 
and openly ignore the election results, or are willing to use non-electoral strategies in order to 
grasp power (e.g. a coup), it is problematic to consider this an instance of electoral 
authoritarianism as this behaviour is symptomatic of the “classic” authoritarian regime (the 
consequences of choice).  
According to Schedler, together these democratic dimensions form a whole which he 
calls the chain democratic choice and as such all of them must be fulfilled. If even a single 
rule is broken, the other parts lose their meaning and the democratic minimum is not 
achieved. The election is then not less democratic, but non-democratic. According to 
Schedler, from the point of view of the classification of regimes this means trespassing the 
boundary between liberal and electoral democracies. Simultaneously, questions arise such as:  
Do patronage and the formal persecution of candidates, for example, truly represent threats of 
the same kind? Schedler admits that the tactics used by authoritarian elites are as varied and 
inventive as the tactics used by elites in democracies. 
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In Schedler’s words, a scholar has to find an answer to two different challenges if 
(s)he wishes to categorize a political regime. First, (s)he has to reckon with the fact that by its 
very severity, that is by demanding the presence of the complete set of aforementioned 
qualities and attributes, the concept of democratic elections as bounded wholes not only 
precludes any kinship with authoritarianism, but also problematizes the variedness and 
dichotomous nature of individual concepts of democracy. Second, the idea that democratic 
elections have a coherent set of qualities opens the way towards the “contextualization of 
comparison” between electoral regimes. In other words, the application of the “chain of 
democratic choice” represents an opportunity to uncover any attempts on the part of 
authoritarian elites to attack the election as the basic democratic procedure. This is a 
methodologically relevant observation. However, the question remains – why talk about less 
democratic elections at all? Why not simply state that in such a situation it is not an election at 
all?  
 
Let us now focus on a third concept which is problematic both by name and in 
definition. Under the rubric of Steven Levitsky’s and Lucan A. Way’s competitive 
authoritarianism (2002a: 51-65) we discover models which for one reason or another (e.g. 
external pressure of the international community, internal political circumstances, etc.) keep 
the formal democratic institutional structure: namely, a combination of a division of power 
and competitive elections. They do this in order to legitimize their existence, and are thus not 
compatible with the classic definition of an authoritarian regime by J. J. Linz.  
The adjective competitive suggests that the electoral victories are achieved in more or 
less standard fair and political competition, without significant manipulation or election 
fixing. This means not only that opposition forces exist and are legal, but that they can also 
compete in elections and achieve successes that are often remarkable. In addition, there are 
independent media (which are absent in a classic authoritarian system), justice and a third 
sector. However, the position of current incumbents is not directly threatened; they do not 
always keep the rules of the election, but rather change them and use the structures and 
resources of the state to bend them. The elites are not afraid to bully and discredit the 
opposition candidates, independent non-governmental organisations or journalists (though 
they rarely eliminate them); they control the dominant state media and use their potential in 
electoral campaigns, etc. All of this is done in a hidden, non-transparent fashion (involving 
bribery, bullying, discrediting), or – as is quite common – under the rubric of lawful 
regulation (accusing opposition candidates of tax evasion or other “common” petty crimes). 
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It is worth mentioning that in addition to the electoral arena Levitsky and Way 
emphasize another three arenas where the opposition can partake in the struggle determining 
the character of the regime: legislature, judiciary and media. At the level of the legislature, it 
is the opposition’s ability to create a power alternative to the Executive that is important; at 
the level of judicial power, it is the ability to stop certain legislative steps, or to keep at least a 
partial independence in individual cases. In the sphere of the media it is a spectrum of 
independent, potentially critical monitoring and investigative journalism.  
At the core of the concept of competitive authoritarianism lies the emphasis on the 
existence of legal opposition whose prospects are not so bad after all. The possibility of 
alternation of the elites in power is open, as likewise are alternative scenarios of development 
or alternative interpretations of the current state of affairs, which represent a significant 
difference to the situation in a classic model of authoritarianism.
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L. Diamond refers to this study of Levitsky and Way in his description of the 
differences between competitive authoritarianisms and hegemonic authoritarianisms. 
However, in his opinion the arenas mentioned above are not all equally suitable for 
quantification and therefore for comparison. Diamond considers the judicial and media arenas 
to be problematic from a methodological point of view; however, in evaluating the electoral 
and legislative arenas one should be able to appreciate their non-democratic character 
adequately.  
Most interesting is Diamond’s attempt to define (and, with reference to the methods 
and data of FH, also to quantify) criteria which could be used to measure the authoritarian 
competitiveness in any regime. According to his criterion for the composition of a Parliament, 
the non-democratic space begins at the ruling party’s 70% majority of seats. According to his 
second criterion concerning the percentage of votes given to the winning presidential 
candidate, 75% marks the threshold between democracy and non-democracy. His third 
criterion, which concerns the period the non-democratic elites are able to keep their power, is 
not quantified at all (either in years or electoral periods), despite the fact that Diamond 
provides a range of examples; the reader be must therefore satisfied with the statement of at 
least medium long continuum of rule of the same elites. 
 
Both of the abovementioned terminological dilemmas, namely, is searching for the 
boundary between electoral democracies and electoral authoritarianism and defining the 
concept of competitive authoritarianism, produce similar and, in our opinion, difficult-to-
solve methodological problems. They disrespect the necessity that the definition is to be made 
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through the noun of the regime category first, in this case either democracy or 
authoritarianism; and only later through the adjective specifying the appropriate type. The 
main problem clearly does not lie in the extraordinary importance attached to the 
phenomenon of an election as a key criterion; the main problem lies in a false application of 
election. The elections can serve to differentiate between democracy and authoritarianism, but 
only under specific (abovedefined) conditions related to a sober stance towards the theory of 
democracy. If, like Diamond and Schedler, we use elections as some sort of criterial 
continuum, we necessarily give up, in our differentiation of regime categories, on the lucidity 
in our classification. To elevate a classic theme of political science – the description and 
analysis of electoral competition – into a paramount, deciding position, is then 
methodologically relevant, but only in defining regime category.  
Levitsky and Way offer, on the one hand, a methodologically more relevant approach 
to the classification of non-democratic regimes, because they do not concentrate solely on the 
phenomenon of the election, but identify other relevant arenas whose study conveys 
information about the character and thus type of the examined non-democratic regime. On the 
other hand they regretfully turn the whole classification of democracies on its head by saying 
that the regimes they studied are both competitive and authoritarian. However, because 
competitiveness is fulfilled solely by the existence of elections, and is therefore the exclusive 
sign of democracy, competitiveness in authoritarianism is a contradiction in terms. We must 
not let ourselves get confused by the banal and completely natural fact that even inside 
democratic forms of government authoritarian ways of executing power are used; not every 
flaw of democracy (and often it can be only considered a flaw in the spirit of modernistic 
liberalism) is enough to stigmatize the regime with the term “authoritarianism”. And after all, 
even authoritarianisms have their faults, the sphere of politics is often not ideally closed and 
they constitute a category that is able to democratize itself; the methods of such 
democratization are defined in studies of transitology. However, if we are dealing with a 
consolidated authoritarianism, competition must not be present.  
 
*** 
 
We would like to end this paper with the following remarks. The authors of new 
typologizations or those who modify existing ones should not ignore Sartori’s classic 
comments on the categorization of political regimes and on the philosophical aspects of 
dealing with the terminological base of social sciences (Sartori 1993). They should always 
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bear in mind the methodological canon which says that one should define the regime category 
first and only then the type of regime within the category. In other words, authoritarian 
models are not less democratic than democracies; they are non-democratic models. But one 
also needs to remain aware that those terms we use are ideal; neither democracy, nor 
authoritarianism (and not even totalitarianism) are absolutely present – but also not absolutely 
absent. They are subject to confrontations with concrete, transient reality; they grow and 
strengthen, or wither and die away in day-to-day processes.  
We believe that separating democracy from non-democracy (which in this paper is 
represented almost exclusively by authoritarianism) is facilitated the most adequately by 
applying the criterion of presence/absence of open, fair and competitive elections. We are 
aware that the study of elections is a rather volatile affair, that it offers a sum of data which 
invites mathematical or statistical analysis, but also a range of non-empirical, value-based or 
value-biased insights, reasonings and statements. The study of elections opens multiple 
pathways. One can start by focusing solely on their formal side, namely their legal definition 
and proclaimed procedural façade; but such a reduction (understandable, for example, in the 
study of law) does not represent a course that would give an adequate answer in political 
science. We must critically monitor other, often more practical factors: the openness of the 
process of nomination, the models of support in the voter–candidate relationship, or the real 
course of the electoral campaign. We are not under the delusion that those are variables which 
would be easy to judge in the empirical-analytical format.  
If we are explicitly to define the limits of using elections as a criterion of 
classification, we have to say that an isolated statement made about one election alone is 
always tentative; equally problematic is the method of synchronous comparison of two 
elections in different countries (even though they might seem formally identical at first); to 
say that an election in one country is more democratic than in another country is problematic 
at best – unless one undergoes as wide a contextual analysis as possible and judges the 
general cultural and political traditions of the given country, which constitute the local colour 
of the given election. Even if the reader can think of a multitude of examples that contradict 
this, and some of those might be almost ridiculously obvious, it is not an argument to the 
contrary – if there is at least one example which fulfils our observation made in the previous 
sentence.  
Diachronic comparison seems to be more reliable. This involves comparing two 
elections in one country one after the other. This is possible even when the two elections take 
place in different format setting and thus seem at the first sight to be empirically non-
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comparable; but precisely the reasons which led to certain legislative change can yield 
interesting information not only about the general political culture of the given polity, but also 
about the elections themselves. It thus seems that a political scientist has the right to claim 
that the election in such and such a year in such and such a country was more or less 
democratic than the previous election; what he is comparing is a developmental trend. IN this 
way, we have identified the minimum comparative, empirical-analytical approach which 
respects the framework of categorization of elections.  
If we come to the conclusion that we are not studying real election, then the regime is 
not democratic, but authoritarian. This means that for the purpose of classification the study 
of elections becomes irrelevant. To identify the type of non-democratic regime studied we 
would need to focus on different variables and factors. This would go beyond the subject of 
the present article, though we by no means hide our affinity to the classic approach of J. J. 
Linz.  
Although the methodological limits of the study of contemporary non-democratic 
regimes, the imperfection of the tools used in research, and the inadequacy of criteria used for 
the analysis, comparison and possible classification of those models
11
 can all seem frustrating 
(Diamond’s text, but also others end in this vein), they are only partially founded. Many 
problems can be avoided by concentrating on the empirical indicators and adequately defining 
one’s goals.  
Finally it is worth mentioning that the contrast between attempts at typology or 
modelling, that is methodological approaches which require a certain amount of creative 
scholarly elegance (and which in this sense look “lifeless”) and the diversity of everyday life, 
which naturally “resists” typologization and pigeon-holing, is still valid. Reality necessarily 
and always transcends the boundaries of man-made “artificial” categories, given that the 
specific, real  regimes change their shape during time. A political scientist cannot but accept 
the unenviable position of an observer stumbling along in search of those constant changes. 
This is just one more reason to respect the proven methods build on empirical data and 
experience and not to let ourselves to be carried away by ideal concepts disconnected from 
reality.  
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1 See Říchová (2000: 270-272) for details, including the comments of Huntington’s adversaries. 
2 The fact that the concept of totalitarian regimes is so static and does not explain the demise of given 
models was always one of the main arguments of its opponents. 
3 Cf. e.g. Hloušek – Kopeček (2003a: 178-192). 
4 Despite our scepticism, we have to admit that in some polities the institute of independent monitoring 
teams is sometimes the only possible method of obtaining relevant electoral data. 
5 Let us mention here some of the suggested trends: the number of politically closed regimes and 
generally of regimes with score higher than 6.5 should decrease, while the number of 
pseudodemocracies and various authoritative forms should increase. Military regimes have pretty 
much disappeared. It also seems that there is little correlation between the size of population of the 
country and its regime type; it is still true, however, that countries which have less than a million 
inhabitants tend to be liberal democracies. 
6 It is probably still useful to distinguish between authoritarian regimes that go the extra mile and 
manipulate the elections and others which do not bother with this masquerade. If the reader is not 
satisfied with finding a variable for categorization, that is fulfiling the basic scientific aspiration, we 
can offer an argument speculating that this distinction suggests something about the nature (and 
eventually the perspective) of the regime studied. We could talk here of open vs. closed or shy versus 
ostentatious authoritarianisms.  
7 It is interesting that Schedler does not believe this decision to be incompatible with Linz’s classic 
distinction between democracies and authoritarianisms.  
8 Schedler reminds us here that in many models undergoing a transition a structured party system is 
absent or very fragmented. Authoritarian elites can take advantage of this in order to prevent a truly 
operational bloc of opposition from appearing (Schedler 2002: 42-43). 
9 As Schedler notes, the problem of patronage belongs here as well. However, patronage does not 
necessarily always have an anti-democratic dimension, although it generally exhibits the tendency to 
expand into clear electoral inequality (Schedler 2002: 44). 
10 Slovakia during the era of Vladimír Mečiar or Romania in the 1990s were, among others, 
considered by Levitsky and Way to be examples of competitive authoritarianisms.   
11 Other texts on this topic were not treated in this study; see e.g. Munck (2006: 27-40).  
